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Introduction
This article focuses on two aspects of the so-called five-day Russian-
Georgian war. One is the Georgian attack on the center of the Ossetian sepa-
ratists, the town of Tskhinvali, on August 7, 2008 — an event that, according 
to some observers, triggered the all-out military clash. The other is the na-
ture of the threats faced by Georgia, and which led to conventional warfare. 
Arguments on the unavoidability of Georgia’s large-scale military stand-off 
with Russia are partly based on some conceptions developed in international 
relations theory. This article attempts through threat analysis to explain and 
justify Georgian political strategy1, while also highlighting the difficulty of its 
support on the international scene. The hypothesis is twofold:
1. A legalistic assessment of this war is insufficient. Internation-
al relations theory provides additional arguments to justify as 
well as to criticize Georgian military actions. But, by and large, it 
gives grounds to assess the August 7 attack as logical and hardly 
avoidable.
2. Taking into account the nature of the threats faced by Georgia, as 
well as the outcome of the war, the Tskhinvali attack appears po-
litically well calculated. Despite the asymmetry of the Georgian 
forces vis-à-vis the Russians, the former’s initiative allegedly saved 
the sovereignty of the country, its political regime and the project 
of Georgian modernization. 
An analysis of the above aspects of the war is given in the context of 
three theoretical traditions. These overlap but are still distinct in an epistemo-
logical and ontological sense. These are liberalism, realism and the so-called 
sociological approach2. Concretely, some of the conceptual observations of re-
alists, neo-realists, liberal-institutionalists and constructivists are adopted in 
order to answer the question: How much did the Georgian military-political 
choice correspond to the fundamental war-and-peace assumptions of the dis-
tinct schools of international relations?
A complex analysis of the threats the Georgian government confronted 
helps to argue for the relevance of one or another theoretical perspective on 
its August 7 decision. As the Russian-Georgian war proves, modern threats 
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are such a mixture of traditional and so-called postmodern elements that 
international law-based institutions are sometimes unable to tackle them. 
Hence extraordinary measures dictated by the uniqueness/desperation of the 
situation become unavoidable. This article argues that Georgian tactics and 
strategy were an example of extraordinariness in a confrontation which, ac-
cording to Ronald Asmus, shook the world3.
Based on existing accounts of these events, on a theoretical matrix, and 
on an analysis of the nature of these threats, this article offers the following 
conclusions: 
While a peace studies/conflict resolution approach, partly rooted in 
liberalist thinking, would challenge almost any military solution, mainstream 
liberals would find the Georgian decision much less questionable. In the 
liberalist view, international institutions, collective security arrangements 
and international norms should govern state behavior. However, if institu-
tions fail, if these norms are not enforced by their promoters — be it West-
ern democracies or the main international actors like NATO, the EU or the 
OSCE — liberalists would agree on the necessity for a threatened state to act 
on its own. According to the liberalist perspective, if anybody should be criti-
cized for the August war, it is an aggressive Russia and some of those West-
ern circles who talked liberally but did not act accordingly.
The realist tradition can criticize the Georgian attack on one particu-
lar account — if its skepticism and partial acceptance of the big states’ zones 
of exclusive influence are taken for granted. In this case, Georgia looks like a 
spoiler of international stability. But through such lenses Georgia should be 
criticized not only and not as much for the attack, but for the desire to join 
the West instead of bandwagoning with Russia. 
Another critical point realists might have is whether the Georgian de-
cision to attack was based on a proper assessment of its own military means 
and those at its adversary’s disposal. However, such aspects of war prepara-
tions are only partly relevant to this case. If the final aim on the Georgian side 
was simply to take and hold the town of Tskhinvali at any cost, then a mil-
itary/technical ends-means calculation becomes of paramount importance. 
But this article argues that it was not. While having its own military ratio-
nale in the light of the deteriorating situation on the ground, the Tskhinvali 
attack was more a political signal than part of military/strategic science that 
Georgia could not afford to follow. 
On the other hand, this very ends/means equation can be taken in a dif-
ferent, broader manner — applied not only to weighing the material strengths 
of both sides, but also to the ability to use the strength of the adversary 
against himself. One can call this method asymmetric warfare, or just recall 
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that war is a continuation of politics. Applying war readiness criteria in this 
manner, engagement without sufficient military/technical preparation might 
sometimes turn out to be more beneficial than expecting a better moment 
which might never come.
However, realism is more complex than either particular structuralist 
view of the international system, or its subfield of military/technical calcula-
tions. By and large, realists’ understanding of the war and peace equilibrium 
rests on concepts of threat assessment, the security dilemma, and the balance 
between defense and offense opportunities. It also unequivocally accepts the 
survival of the nation state as being the ultimate rationale of international 
relations. According to these principles, Georgian actions during the Russian 
aggression appear mostly logical and justifiable.
Constructivism, or the sociological approach, departs from liberal/re-
alist objectivity, focuses on perceptions and on norms constituting or guid-
ing identities, including on the international scene, and accepts their inher-
ent drive for control and survival. With its emphasis on so-called securiti-
zation — that is, the legitimization of security/military decisions through an 
inter-subjective communicational process — constructivism shows that wars 
do not happen just because politicians so desire. Given the internationally 
accepted account of the events of the Russia-Georgia war, constructivism 
would agree that Georgians had every right to perceive an immediate, im-
minent threat and to act against it militarily. But constructivism also shows 
that some of Georgia’s critics, having their own cultural/ideological prejudic-
es, would hardly change.
A justification of Georgia’s military option through realist, constructiv-
ist and even liberalist lenses looks stronger when the complex nature of the 
threats faced by the country’s political system is characterized. Ignoring or 
underestimating this complexity seems to be one reason for continued criti-
cism of Georgia, whether on account of the war or of its democratic record. 
This article does not go into the realist/constructivist debate as to whether 
threats are objective or perceptional in their essence: Both schools believe in 
their convincing power. This article relies on widely accepted definitions of 
traditional as well as new threats, and tries to outline the postmodern flavor 
of the latter. It then argues that the Russian government was the direct pro-
ducer or user of these threats in order to undermine Georgia’s political secu-
rity and to bring about regime change. This is why their emergence contrib-
uted to the Georgian military confrontation with Russia.
Traditional threats and political pressure coming from Russia are rela-
tively well documented on the international level4. However, hypothetically, 
all these could have been endured beyond August 7, 2008, as some foreign 
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supporters of Georgia have suggested. Yet what forced Georgian military ac-
tion was the combination of the above-mentioned threats with “postmod-
ern”5 ones. This combination did not leave the Georgian government with 
much space for further maneuvering. In parallel to Russia’s open military-
political hostility, the Georgian government faced the risk of internal desta-
bilization from various non-state circles, including organized crime, as well as 
the ignorance of international democracy assistants about the level and scope 
of this challenge. Both internal risks and external ignorance were exacerbated 
by “active measures” of provocation and disinformation characteristic of the 
Russian special services. 
Analyzing the nature of the threats to Georgia, it becomes rather prob-
able that, if the Georgian government had stayed only defensive in August 
2008 the fall of the local Georgian administration and a new exodus of waves 
of refugees from the conflict zone would be unavoidable. Such a scenario 
would easily allow Russia to disguise its intervention, contribute covertly to 
the creation of the image that the Georgian government was inherently inca-
pable of conflict resolution, and re-activate its “fifth column” in the Georgian 
capital. All this would negatively influence the investment climate through-
out the whole country. The rest would have been tactics — either the govern-
ment would fall due to mass discontent, or further destabilization attempts 
would have been made.
This article argues that Russia not only wanted to take Georgian sepa-
ratist enclaves, it also wanted to dissuade the country from its pro-Western 
foreign policy. The Kremlin might have had even stronger incentives for Saa-
kashvili’s ouster: Since 2003 Georgia had launched a modernization project, 
building a regime different from the post-Soviet Russian one. In the case 
of irreversible success, this would have created an example that the Kremlin 
did not like. Thus, days and weeks of skirmishing in and around the town of 
Tskhinvali can be seen as an element of a clash between two alternative sys-
tems in the former Soviet area. Manipulations with post-modern conditions 
played a decisive role in this clash.
Attacking Tskhinvali on August 7, Saakashvili got the following: Rus-
sia had to disclose its intentions, invading directly and occupying half of the 
country. Georgians had to flee from around Tskhinvali anyway. But, inter-
nationally, Russian actions looked so illegal that the West finally intervened 
and substantially reversed the process. On the other hand, Saakashvili mo-
bilized mass support internally, since he was literally fighting “the enemy at 
the gate”. This did not allow revisionists inside Georgia to topple the govern-
ment alone or in concert with the Russians6. Foreign investments were lost 
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for a while, but international donor assistance to war-affected Georgia pro-
vided a substitute.
One cannot prove with mathematical precision whether things would 
have necessarily developed tragically for Georgia if its army had not attacked 
Tskhinvali — the social sciences do not provide methods for this. It does not 
argue, either, that the Georgian government had forecast everything in de-
tail, namely that the Russian response would have been so outrageous as to 
prompt an international response. But looking at the perspectives of interna-
tional relations theory on the fight for sovereignty, and analyzing the nature 
of the threats directed, coordinated or simply used by Russia against Geor-
gia, its military action can be regarded as hardly avoidable in the “fog of war”. 
With high probability, the Georgian attack could have rendered the Russians 
inadequate and thus the eventual losers on the information front; the attack 
could also have slowed down the realization of their plan to go further and 
dislodge the government. 
Internationally, President Saakashvili gave rise to doubts on the pro-
portionality of his action. But Russia was converted from an imperfect peace-
keeper into an occupying power. In the long run, and in the systemic account, 
this might be a better ground for the international promotion of Georgia’s 
sovereignty than if Georgia had continued to be manipulated by the Russian 
peacekeeping game, which one Georgian politician described as “keeping the 
pieces” of its former empire.
Existing Assessments of Events
The war of August 7-12, 2008 is largely associated with Russia’s inter-
vention in neighboring Georgia. The international community was relatively 
quick to condemn Russian military actions. The French president, represent-
ing the EU, set out to negotiate a ceasefire, while the US president ordered 
the navy to move into the Black Sea and to approach the Georgian coast-
line. On August 19, after a ceasefire had been achieved but was barely being 
respected by Russia, NATO’s North Atlantic Council stated: “The Alliance 
is considering seriously the implications of Russia’s actions for the NATO-
Russia relationship. . .we cannot continue with business as usual”7. On Sep-
tember 1, the European Council held an extraordinary meeting. Its conclu-
sion was that “the European Council is gravely concerned by the open con-
flict which has broken out in Georgia, by the resulting violence and by the 
disproportionate reaction of Russia” 8.
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The European Parliament was more explicit, saying in its September 
3 resolution that “there is no legitimate reason for Russia to invade Georgia, 
to occupy parts of it and to threaten to override the government of a demo-
cratic country”9.  The European Parliament demanded respect for the cease-
fire agreement, namely the withdrawal of Russian troops to their pre-war po-
sitions10. This meant that Russia was required to restore the status quo ante 
when, according to the 1992 and 1994 Russian-Georgian agreements, it was 
limited to a few peacekeeping battalions in the Georgian conflict zones cre-
ated by the Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist movements.
This resolution outlined that the large-scale war was preceded by Rus-
sian illegal support to the Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists, as well as 
“provocations by the South Ossetian separatist forces involving... shellings 
which caused the deaths”. It also noted that the eventual Russian large-scale 
invasion was based on “a long-term military build-up”. But European parlia-
mentarians were also questioning the wisdom of the Georgian “surprise ar-
tillery attack on Tskhinvali”11. 
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly was more concrete in 
respect of the August 7 attack. Its resolution of October 2, 2008 also men-
tioned that “the outbreak of the war on 7 August 2008... was the result of a 
serious escalation of tension... which had started much earlier”. It condemned 
Russia on many accounts. But the fifth paragraph said “the initiation of shell-
ing of Tskhinvali without warning by the Georgian military on 7 August 
2008 marked a new level of escalation, namely that of open and fully fledged 
warfare”. Georgian actions at that particular moment were assessed as dis-
proportionate, thus violating humanitarian law and the commitment to the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts.
These documents were adopted in parallel to the Russian-Georgian in-
formation war. Georgia insisted on the defensive nature of its August 7 oper-
ation, as it was made against Ossetian militiamen and mercenaries from Rus-
sia who were shooting, as well as the ongoing intervention of Russian regular 
troops with heavy equipment, heading through the Roki Tunnel to Tskhin-
vali via Georgia-controlled villages12. Russia claimed that there were no ex-
tra Russian troops, except peacekeepers, in the conflict zones when President 
Saakashvili attacked “sleeping Tskhinvali”, causing deaths among civilians 
and Russian peacekeepers. Thus Russia had to enforce the peace. Given these 
mutually exclusive accounts, and the interest of the international community 
in the issue, the EU sponsored an International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia, led by the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. 
The international media were also taking part in this information war. 
The most respected media outlets were openly critical of Russia, but also sus-
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picious of the Georgian attack13. The Georgian narrative strengthened when 
four journalists from the New York Times reported about new intelligence 
that “... at a minimum, the intercepted calls, which senior American offi-
cials have reviewed and described as credible if not conclusive, suggest there 
were Russian military movements earlier than had previously been acknowl-
edged, whether routine or hostile, into Georgian territory as tensions acceler-
ated toward war”14. The Russians belatedly responded that a military column 
might have really moved, but it was a reinforcement of the peacekeepers. The 
fact that such reinforcements were not coordinated with the host nation was 
a violation of the peacekeeping arrangement. But international criticism of 
Georgian military actions, albeit more nuanced, continued. A year after the 
start of the war, the Economist wrote: “The truth is somewhere in between”, 
suggesting that, despite systematic Russian provocations, Saakashvili’s order 
to advance on Tskhinvali “played into his enemy’s hands”15.
These doubts remained in the final report of the Fact-Finding Mis-
sion, published in September 2009. This report is an extremely rich collection 
of evidence, logical questions and somewhat controversial legal conclusions. 
The controversy may stem from the dilution of legalism with some political 
considerations. However, this report could also be evidence that certain prin-
ciples of international law are inadequate given the changing nature of the 
international security environment.
On the one hand, the mission documented numerous violations by 
Russia of Georgia’s sovereignty and the 1992-1994 peace accords. The au-
thors concluded that the years-long linkage of Georgia’s uncontrolled prov-
inces with Russia, which was going on under the cover of the above-men-
tioned accords, “may have increased the Georgian frustration at the stalled 
peace process”16. The mission was also well informed on increased pressure 
from Russia on Georgia, which started from spring 2008 when the Russian 
authorities made explicit moves towards the establishment of official politi-
cal, economic and military relationships with two Georgian separatist ter-
ritories. All this was combined with never-ending skirmishes between Os-
setian militia and Georgian law enforcers or peacekeepers legally positioned 
within the conflict zone. The mission refers to Russian sources indicating that 
separatists were assisted by Russia with training and ammunition, and seems 
confident that, prior to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, the conflict zone 
was penetrated by Russian mercenaries. The report also talks about the high 
probability that, earlier than officially reported, some Russian regular units 
not belonging to the peacekeepers, had entered the scene17. 
The report also questioned one of the main arguments, which was espe-
cially listened to in the West18, as to why the Russian army had to intervene 
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militarily. It stated that the mission was not in a position to prove a Geor-
gian attack on Russian peacekeepers. It appears the mission was impressed 
by a non-governmental Russian account of this war detail. Andrey Illarionov, 
a former advisor to Vladimir Putin, undertook his own research, showing 
that deaths among Russian peacekeepers could have occurred only after they 
themselves had engaged Georgian units19.
However, despite all the facts outlined in the report, the mission stated 
that it was not in a position to consider as sufficiently substantiated the Geor-
gian claim concerning a large-scale Russian military incursion into South 
Ossetia before August 8, 200820. Thus the mission refused to accept the Geor-
gian attack on Tskhinvali as an act of legitimate self-defense, while noting 
that open hostilities were started by that attack21. Interpreting clauses of the 
UN Charter, as well as UN Resolution 1344 on the nature of armed attacks, 
and some definitions of the International Court of Justice, the report par-
ticularly concludes:
1. Attacks on Georgian villages in the conflict zone can be regarded 
as an attack on Georgia, thus invoking Article 51 of the UN Char-
ter for self-defense, but “further conditions must be met in order to 
allow for the Georgian claim of self-defense.” In short, the mission 
could not establish who fired the first shot22.
2. Repulsing Ossetian attacks did not require an attack on Tskhinvali23. 
3. The military operation against the Russian army could have been 
justified if it was involved in an “on-going or imminent attack”. 
Regular Russian units entering the Roki tunnel, or even prepara-
tions for such an operation, namely, the concentration of troops 
on the border “might have constituted an armed attack”. However, 
the mission states that, despite the existence of elements of threats 
and signs that Russian regular units had entered the conflict zone 
prior to August 8, it cannot ascertain such an imminent attack by 
Russia24.
4. Another reason for Georgian military action on August 7 could 
have been the blatant violation of peace accords by Russian peace-
keepers. For such a claim the mission refers to Article 3 (e) of UN 
Resolution 1344 as a legal ground for measuring Russian peace-
keepers’ aggressiveness25. But the mission concludes that, according 
to Article 51 of the UN Charter, such an act of aggression does not 
justify the application of the right of self-defense. Moreover, the 
mission also added that to justify the Georgian reaction, the viola-
tion of the peace accords by Russian peacekeepers should have had 
the form of an intervention or occupation, a substantial increase in 
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numbers, or the arming of one of the conflicting sides. Despite ac-
quaintance with Russian sources indicating Russian military sup-
port for the separatists26, the mission refused to confirm either of 
the above justifications. 
5. If Ossetian attacks were closely coordinated with the Russians, it 
“would likely trigger Georgian self-defense” against its northern 
neighbor. But to prove such a connection, the fact of Russian “ef-
fective control” of the Ossetian perpetrators would have to be es-
tablished. The mission refers to the ICJ definition, according to 
which “‘effective control’ should be proved in regards of every ac-
tion and every individual in action and relevant state instructions 
should exist… mere influence, rather than control of the persons 
acting does not suffice”. The mission acknowledges that even prior 
to the escalation “Russian officials had de facto control over the 
South Ossetia security institutions and security forces”. Russian 
citizens, and former Russian military or security officers played a 
prominent role in the Ossetian security sector. Yet the mission de-
clared that, formally, they were all subordinated to de facto presi-
dent of the separatist region and thus it is impossible to define the 
degree of “effective control” of them by Russia27.
Thus the Fact-Finding Mission’s report contributed to the debates on 
the start of war but fell short of providing an unequivocal judgment. Interna-
tional debates continued, mainly by political analysts and journalists. Exam-
ples of two opposite views on Georgian actions are Ronald Asmus’s analysis 
and Tom de Waal’s response to it. Asmus does not exclude that Saakashvili 
made a mistake when ordering the attack on Tskhinvali. But to him “why he 
did it is not a mystery”28. Tom de Waal criticizes Asmus in the article “Mis-
siles over Tskhinvali”29, for an “idealized account.”
According to Asmus, the Ossetians used weapons of illegal caliber in 
the conflict zone prior to the full-scale war, while Russian peacekeepers re-
mained either supportive of the Ossetians or inactive in halting the skirmish-
es. He emphasizes that the Ossetian secretary of the Security Council was 
a Russian general, the prime minister, interior minister and the minister of 
defense were all Russian citizens, and the de-facto president of the separatist 
enclave, Eduard Kokoiti, who was openly threatening to “clean out” Geor-
gian villages30, had a direct telephone “hot-line” with the Kremlin. Asmus 
also stresses that additional Russian troops were concentrating and entering 
the Roki tunnel.
Asmus does not argue with the EU-sponsored mission on whether all 
this is enough to establish the fact of “effective control” of the Ossetians by 
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the Russians. He also does not quantify how many Russian soldiers and how 
much equipment crossing the Georgian border illegally would have justi-
fied Georgia’s right to self-defense according to the UN Charter. Instead, he 
shows what kind of political and strategic challenge it all could have created 
for the Georgian government: “on the path of those Russian forces lay the 
Georgian villages in the Didi Liakhvi valley as well as the Tbilisi-supported 
alternative South Ossetian government in the village of Kurta. — Kurta also 
was the heart and soul of Georgia’s own strategy to win over the hearts and 
minds of South Ossetians through “soft power”31. 
Given the arguments and despite the fact that “the fog of war was al-
ready setting in”– thus making the scale of the Russo-Ossetian advance on 
Georgian-controlled villages unclear — Asmus considers the Georgian oper-
ation largely defensive32. To argue for Georgian confidence in an imminent 
threat, he recalls “past Russian calls for regime change” throughout the coun-
try. He also mentions that desperate Georgian attempts to communicate with 
the Russians in these last moments before the all-out war went unanswered. 
In de Waal’s view, “Asmus gives a version of events of the war of 2008 
that completely exempts the Georgian leadership of blame”. De Waal still 
questions the existence of a substantial Russian military movement prior to 
the Tskhinvali attack and even the fact of the Ossetians’ shelling of a Geor-
gian villages on the seventh of August. In his version: “on August 7, 2008, af-
ter weeks of low-intensity skirmishes in the breakaway province of South Os-
setia, President Saakashvili made a decision to attack and recapture its capital 
Tskhinvali. The Russians had been building up their presence among their 
increasingly partisan peacekeepers for weeks and were very likely preparing 
an operation of their own, perhaps to depose the alternative pro-Georgian 
leader resident in the territory. Saakashvili was certainly acting under equal 
parts threat and provocation on the ground - but it was he who struck first… 
In this small, multiethnic patch of land, ethnic Georgian and Ossetian vil-
lages adjoined one another in a complex jigsaw puzzle. The severing of a road 
here or a new roadblock there threatened encirclement or expulsion for one 
community or the other. Saakashvili took a gamble”33.
However, despite his disagreement with the previous author and his ap-
parent dislike of Saakashvili, de Waal’s account does not differ from that of 
Asmus in all respects. De Waal also acknowledges that “it was Russia which 
was allowed to secure the situation inside both Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia with peacekeeping troops who were basically enforcing a Pax Russica.” 
He even says that “[Saakashvili] was, strange to say, less to blame than his 
Western friends”. But besides his stronger disagreement with Saakashvili’s at-
tempts to challenge Russia, de Waal disagree with Asmus on one more issue: 
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For him, Americans wrongly encouraged Georgians’ bid for NATO member-
ship, instead of helping Russo-Georgian relations being based on the USSR-
Finnish pattern.
One more worthwhile account of the war is Andrey Illarionov’s. This 
is based on thorough research of Russian actions prior to and during the five 
day war. In his interview with Ekho Moskvi Moscow radio on September 
8, 2009, Illarionov described the severe violations of peace arrangements by 
Russia over the years. As to the August escalation, for Illarionov this was trig-
gered by Russian peacekeepers, who apparently allowed the Ossetians to use 
peacekeeping installations for launching fire.
As mentioned above, the reason that different conclusions are based 
on more or less the same account of the facts can be either in shortcomings 
of international law, which does not allow sensing the nuances and the con-
text, or in the different political/theoretical premises of the analysts quoted. 
For instance, without referring to theories, Asmus still shows a certain logic 
of liberal institutionalism and constructivism, while in the description of the 
strategic meaning of certain valleys and villages for Georgia, he even sounds 
like a realist strategist. As for de Waal’s arguments, consciously or not, they 
oscillate between peace studies logic, which is partly rooted in the liberal-
ist tradition, and neo-realism. The latter reveals itself in his suggestion about 
Georgia’s Finlandization. 
The members of the EU-sponsored fact-finding mission admitted that 
legal experts differ in their opinion as to what the response to a so-called 
imminent threat should be. Disagreement among lawyers also takes place on 
external intervention in civil war-like conflicts34. The political theory-related 
preferences of the mission members cannot be excluded either. The mission 
was not political or diplomatic. However, one of their findings, namely the 
criticism of the EU for its reluctance to engage in regional security issues35, 
sounds political. 
The Applicability of International Relations 
Theory to the August 7 Attack
The authors quoted above established that violent events were taking 
place on Georgian soil for weeks, if not months and years; Russian peace-
keeping was counterproductive, to put it mildly. Hence, whether ongoing, im-
minent, hypothetical or of any other nature, the Georgian leadership could 
have had a sincere feeling of the threat to Georgian positions in the conflict 
zones and, eventually, to nationwide political security. It is also well docu-
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mented that the West was not ready to take up the challenge of international 
peacekeeping prior to the war. Georgia had to act on its own. But the ques-
tion remains: When and how? 
Saakashvili’s order to Georgian troops at 23.35 reads: Halt the Russian 
advance on Georgian territory; suppress the fire targeted at Georgian villages 
in the region; provide security for the population36. Are the facts that today 
20% of Georgia remains occupied by Russian troops without any internation-
ally recognized mandate, and that there are no more Georgian villages in the 
former conflict zone unintended consequences of Saakashvili’s order? Did his 
order aggravate regional security or would things have got worse for him, for 
Georgian sovereignty and for the whole region, if Georgian soldiers had not 
attacked Tskhinvali, thus altering the modalities of the highly probable pre-
planned Russian invasion? 
One can agree or disagree with Heidi Tagliavini, Ronald Asmus, Tom 
de Waal or others quoted in this paper. It is impossible to devise a test for 
“what would have happened if ”. But applying international relations the-
ory to this case may complement the controversial legal analysis. Asking 
what the liberalist, realist and constructivist approaches would have to say 
on Saakashvili’s decision, as well as on others’ judgments of him, sheds extra 
light on whether Saakashvili could have made any other decision when time 
was short, information incomplete, fears paramount and “the fog of war was 
already setting in”37. The prominent realist theoretician John Mearsheimer 
points out that the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories 
best explain international politics38. One could add that for an understanding 
of this “laboratory”, including its diverse and contradicting legal and cultural 
norms, we need a theoretical perspective.
The Liberalist Tradition. Theories born within a liberalist paradigm 
are closely linked to modern international law, at least through advocating 
that international regimes and norms are able to change the behavior of ego-
istic states. The liberalist tradition can be regarded as a basis for collective and 
cooperative security ideas, and democratic peace theory. In a certain sense, 
peace studies and conflict resolution approaches, which have diverse roots, 
including Marxism and critical theory, can also be partially linked with a lib-
eralist worldview: This linkage is based upon the shared believe in general ra-
tionality and the progress-oriented nature of mankind, as well as the special 
accentuation of human rights. 
While many liberalists accept the continuous dominance of states and 
the anarchic nature of the international system, they see a strong autonomous 
role for actors other than the state in international politics. Some go further 
to regard the idea of the nation as obsolete, eroded by globalization. More 
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pragmatic neoliberal-institutionalists count on international institutions/re-
gimes, and, eventually on the so-called “security community” of states, which 
can mitigate nationalist bias. Approaches based on such a tradition remain 
dominant in international political discourse, if not in politics itself. Advocat-
ing a shift from hard to soft power, meaning moral authority and an ability to 
work cooperatively39, governments adhering to such a tradition have a distaste 
for the use of force for national purposes. This is understandable, as much as 
the notion of human security with its emphasis on people/the individual as 
the centerpiece of security policy is also linked with the liberalist tradition40.
From a certain angle, the liberalist tradition can question Saakashvi-
li’s decision of August 7. Such a worldview can be regarded as intellectual 
grounds for the many legalistic points presented in the report of the fact-
finding mission. In its particular form of human security approach the liber-
alist outlook may be especially critical of Saakashvili’s decision: Taking people 
as a main referent object of security policy, an attack on the town, notwith-
standing the threat to Georgian positions or sovereignty, becomes harder to 
justify. The peace studies/conflict resolution perspective would have advocat-
ed negotiations, compromises, peacefully avoiding a conflict regardless of the 
security situation on the ground.
Tom de Waal’s belief that “…Saakashvili’s impetuous efforts to recover 
the two territories rebounded on him disastrously”41 can also be regarded as 
stemming from the same, “conflict resolution” version of the liberalist tradi-
tion. Essentially, the ultra-liberal spirit of discounting the state/national in-
terests of Georgia, regarding its nationalism as the main reason for the con-
flict and the eventual attack on August 7, is represented in a joint paper by 
Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell. These see the Georgian attack as 
a “classic attempt to use nationalism to deflect attention from its domestic 
failings”. Calling for restraint in US governmental assistance in Georgia’s 
defense build-up42, the authors show an indifferent attitude towards nations’ 
right of self-defense and territorial integrity. 
However, this does not mean that the liberalist perspective could never 
understand or even justify a desperate military option, including the Geor-
gian attack. Advocacy for peace at any cost and negotiations in every situa-
tion is a relatively marginal attitude within this intellectual tradition. One of 
the advocates of Georgian conduct in August 2008, Ronald Asmus can also 
be regarded as a devoted practicing liberal. For years he has been working on 
developing a cooperative European security order, which he believes “failed 
in August 2008”43.
Some realist scholars note that an unconditional belief in international 
institutions can deceive nations, putting them in danger. According to John 
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Mearsheimer, “misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead 
to more failures in the future”44. But many prominent academicians from 
various liberalist camps do acknowledge that institutionalism can only be 
conditional. For Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, who are unquestionably 
liberals, institutions cannot prevent war regardless of the structure in which 
they operate45.
Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan speak on collective security 
with the same reservation. For these representatives of liberalist tradition “the 
key question is not whether collective security is flawless, but it deters and 
blocks aggressors more effectively than balancing under anarchy”46. Howev-
er, “states that place illusory faith in collective security will find themselves 
worse off than had they acted as if in a self-help, anarchic setting”47. Given 
such opinions, Saakashvili’s disputed decision could also have been grounded 
in the liberalist tradition.
But the problem with the institutionalist theory, as well as with the col-
lective security or conflict-resolution approaches, is that not all of their prac-
ticing followers, including officials, maintain such a cautious, sober attitude. 
As Robert Kagan puts it in “Of Paradise and Power”, admittedly in a some-
what exaggerated style, Europe today lives in a “postmodern system” that does 
not rest on balance of power but on “the rejection of force” and on “self-en-
forced rules of behavior”48. According to Kagan, many European politicians 
“often emphasize process over results, believing that ultimately process can 
become substance”49. They “routinely apply Europe’s experience to the rest of 
the world, and sometimes with the evangelical zeal of converts”50.
When Kagan points out that Europeans pretend they understand the 
world and can give others the wisdom of conflict resolution51, it is not the 
thoughts of theoreticians like Keohane or the Kupchans that come to the 
mind. It is more those international observers who say that the Russian mili-
tary incursion was not on a scale that required an armed response. Ronald As-
mus makes a case for the inadequacy of some Western conflict-resolution ad-
vice regarding Georgian-Ossetian/Georgian-Abkhaz or an eventual Russo-
Georgian reconciliation. He convincingly argues that the separatists saw the 
source of their power and identity in an alliance with Russians and in con-
frontation with Georgia52. If so, what was the sense in the endless confidence-
building exercises suggested by many Western diplomats and NGOs without 
tangible pressure on Russia to give up its dominant position on the ground? 
The final judgment of the Georgian attack through liberalist lenses may 
depend not so much on preferring one version of liberalism over another. The 
key to this question is whether the international community, which prizes 
the rule of law, cooperation, and supra-national institutions, and which ac-
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cepted the critical remarks on the Georgian attack, itself acted accordingly. 
The Kupchans warned in the nineties that “if NATO expands into Central 
Europe as a defensive military alliance and then stops… that would help de-
fine for Russia what its new sphere of influence is”53. European politicians, 
whom Asmus does not regard as Russia’s “appeasers”, refused to give Georgia 
a NATO Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest summit in April 2008. 
Assessing this decision, Asmus admits that “instead of deterring the Russians, 
this compromise might have emboldened them”54. 
For Keohane a “…multilateral institution that ignored genocide… 
would not be normatively legitimate”55. Proving genocide in the Russo-Geor-
gian war which the Western community ignored or overlooked is difficult. 
But Russian military aggression against Georgia was long hanging in the 
air, if not ongoing. At a minimum, it was threatening occupation and ethnic 
cleansing. Citing different examples of liberalist thinking, one can conclude 
that liberalism would have been a logical and legitimate ground to criticize 
Georgian military action if the international community, designed on the 
lines of the liberal-institutionalists’ vision, had acted decisively to stop Rus-
sia prior to August 8. As is known, even from the fact-finding mission’s ac-
count, this did not happen. Georgia was left alone to struggle for its sover-
eignty with whatever means were at her disposal. The liberalist tradition does 
not deny abandoned, desperate countries the right to act in accordance with 
their own judgment. It gives an argument to conclude that, by and large, 
mainstream liberals would back the Georgian decision on August 7 in prin-
ciple, if not in its details.
The insights of liberal-institutionalism can also be used to question 
the logic of the fact-finding mission’s conclusions on the Georgian attack: 
If Georgia had objective reason to feel abandoned by the international secu-
rity architecture, as the mission indirectly accepts, how can advocates of that 
architecture claim that the aggression faced by the country was not large 
enough to justify self-defense? One can agree with the American analyst Da-
vid Smith that “reading the EU-commissioned report, Russia (and others) 
may perceive that the west will tolerate aggression so long as it can rational-
ize that an attack is not “large-scale”56. 
The Realist School. Realism is usually understood as a belief in an 
infinite international balance of power; the egoistic and nationalistic nature 
of states; their similarity notwithstanding their internal regimes; the depen-
dence of their behavior on a quest for power and/or systemic variables; and 
the interchangeability of the status quo, revisionism or even appeasement 
policies, depending on threats and capabilities. According to the realists, 
states will not subordinate themselves to international institutions, which 
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are just vehicles for the dominance of stronger national powers. Given this, 
one might ask whether some representatives of Western liberal-democratic 
states act regarding the Russo-Georgian confrontation along realist lines, 
also known as Realpolitik? The scholarly observation that, while liberalists 
believe in institutional harmony and realists do not, “in fact security related 
policies of governments are normally a combination of the two”57, might fur-
ther strengthen this doubt.
Given its basic premises, and knowing the facts as established by in-
ternational experts, it is essentially clear that consistent followers of a realist 
outlook would not judge Saakashvili’s decision on August 7 on apolitically 
moral, legal or institutional grounds. Hence, one needs to see if realists or 
neo-realists would agree with the Georgian option on the pragmatic or even 
skeptical grounds they are associated with.
One set of presumptions within the realist worldview would not favor 
Georgia’s assertiveness to distance itself from Russia, which led to more open 
forms of conflict. If Asmus’s conclusion about the underlying reason for the 
war being Georgia’s desire to move towards the West and Russia’s attempt to 
stop it is accepted as objective, then some realists might be more critical of 
Georgia, not Russia. De Waal’s criticism of US encouragement of the Geor-
gian bid for NATO membership instead of helping it establish a Finnish-
Soviet pattern of relations with Russia has the flavor of a realist argument. 
Neorealist Kenneth Waltz argued decades ago for the advantages of US-So-
viet bipolarity. He wrote in the seventies that “the control of East European 
affairs by one great power is tolerated by the other precisely because their 
competing interventions would pose undue dangers”58. 
At the beginning of the nineties another representative of realism, John 
Mearsheimer, was arguing that the West should have been interested in the 
survival of the USSR and its partial military presence in some European 
states in order to maintain bipolarity and allow the US to stay in Europe 
for the sake of stability59. Thus, through the lenses of Waltz or Mearsheimer, 
Georgia could have contributed to destabilization, putting its American ally 
in an awkward situation.
However, if these or other realist scholars were to be asked specifically 
about the Georgian midnight attack, they would hardly condemn Saakash-
vili’s order. They would definitely attempt to explain Russia’s aggressiveness, 
as well as the realist rationale in the behavior of European nations/institu-
tions before, during or after the war. But applying some realist principles, they 
would also agree that the Georgian government had reason to act as it did:
Mearsheimer argues that “when security is scarce, states become more 
concerned about relative gains than absolute gains. They ask “who will gain 
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more?”60 This logic shows that realists would consider Western advice to Saa-
kashvili to forget the conflict zones and to concentrate on other political or 
economic issues as inherently impossible to accept. Hence, in realist terms, 
he should have focused on undermining Russian dominance in the conflict 
zones, whether this would have raised the risk of open Russian aggression 
or not. Using de Waal’s expression, he should have taken a gamble. That is 
what he did.
Tom de Waal describes the surroundings of Tskhinvali as a “small, mul-
tiethnic patch of land, [where] ethnic Georgian and Ossetian villages ad-
joined one another in a complex jigsaw puzzle. The severing of a road here 
or a new roadblock there threatened encirclement or expulsion for one com-
munity or the other”61. Adding in Russian steps to violate Georgian sover-
eignty, the escalation of violence in the conflict zones, and the popularity of 
the struggle for territorial integrity among Georgians, this “patch of land” of 
a few hundred square miles and a few tens of thousands of inhabitants can 
be seen as a strategic one. In such a situation, the realists would measure the 
proportionality of actions not only in terms of international law, but also ac-
cording to local “geopolitics” — that is, the level of the military-political im-
portance of particular territorial segments. 
The realist-like observations that certain terrain (mountains, exclusively 
ethnic territory) are more suitable to take or defend and “…fearful of the fu-
ture, weaker groups may resort to preemptive violence”62 have direct relevance 
to the situation in August 2008. Recalling Asmus’s point that this patch of 
contested land was not just its geographic location, but it was the residence 
of heart and soul of the Georgian conflict resolution strategy, namely a pro-
Georgian autonomous administration, fighting for it looks paramount when 
seen through realist lenses.
The same realist outlook holds that if strategies and technologies for 
offense dominate over defensive ones, incentives to preempt increase63. Prog-
ress in technology and mobility is especially increasing the attractiveness of 
attack. An attacker might hope that a move will give him an informational 
advantage and a quick success. Also, “the fear that the opponent might launch 
such an attack first could be a persuasive argument for preemption”64. Not-
withstanding the debate mentioned above as to whether or not the Russian 
advance prior to the Georgian attack was an offense of sufficient level to trig-
ger an immediate response, realist logic sets a guide to act against adversaries 
not only defensively in the traditional or legal sense, but also preemptively. 
It is also worth noting that militarily, given the terrain of the conflict 
zone65 and the pre-war training of Georgian troops whom Western partners 
had prepared particularly for peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, Georgia 
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was not ready for conventional defense. In this situation, given operative evi-
dence on the movement of additional units from the north, preemptive ac-
tion could have been the only military option to gain time and attract inter-
national attention. 
On one point, Georgia’s preemption against Russia can be countered by 
a strategic/military studies argument that the strength of the adversary and 
the ability to act against him should be almost mathematically calculated. 
However, states do not act only according to material calculations. Interna-
tional relations theory and history provide that the military are subordinate 
to politics. It also makes one think, as outlined in the next chapter, that the 
nature of the threats, the role of information warfare and the struggle for the 
hearts and minds of Georgian society could not and would not allow con-
sidering the defense/offense balance only in numerical terms. But the ends/
means equation cannot easily refute the rationale of the Georgian attack even 
on its merits. Despite the incomparable weakness of the Georgian army vis-
à-vis the Russian one, its military initiative on August 7 still falls even under 
purely military-strategic or tactical logic, especially if one includes political 
calculations. 
This surprise attack was strong enough to overrun Ossetian and Rus-
sian forces already engaged with Georgians on the ground and to stop the 
movement of military reinforcements spotted by Georgian intelligence on 
that day. Hence, it should have been for the adversary to start thinking 
whether to engage in an all-out explicit war with its political costs, or to try 
a less aggressive, refreshing re-start in relations with Georgia. At the same 
time, a large scale military clash lasting just a single day could have given the 
international community a strong signal to engage and halt the confronta-
tion. If lucky, Georgia could have had a better field positions for the moment 
of international intervention, if not, it was still possible that a belated inter-
nationalization of the conflict would have finally taken place and become the 
main guarantee against Russian subversive activities. And finally, the Geor-
gian operation was opening a corridor and giving time for the almost encir-
cled Georgian villages and the pro-governmental administration to withdraw 
relatively safely if necessity dictated. 
Returning to the general question of the justifiability of the Georgian 
decision, it is worth mentioning that some realists do not insist that the ne-
cessity for an attack or counter-attack should and can be objectively proven. 
“If states think the offense is strong, they will act as if it were. Thus offense-
defense theory has two parallel variants, real and perceptual”66. According to 
Stephen Van Evera, notwithstanding material reality, “the perception of of-
fense dominance is fairly widespread”67. 
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One more observation of Evera’s is especially relevant to the justifica-
tion of the Georgian armed attack on Tskhinvali. Unlike legal experts, he is 
much more flexible in assessing what constitutes an attack on a state, argu-
ing that “subversion is a form of offense, and it affects international relations 
in the same way as do offensive military capabilities”68. No legal or liberally-
minded analyst would argue that Georgia had not been facing subversive ac-
tivities for years. The linkages of these with Russia did not go unnoticed even 
by the fact-finding mission operating under EU auspices.
In the light of pre-August 7 events as described by Illarionov, Asmus 
and the EU fact-finding mission, realists would confirm that Saakashvili’s 
decision was consistent with their understanding of the war and peace equa-
tion. For them, these accounts can hardly mean anything but blatant viola-
tion of sovereignty and a clear threat to an independent state through subver-
sion or direct intervention, which is a ground for a military response. Unlike 
some liberal thinkers, realists might not question the West’s caution prior to 
the war or afterwards. But, on the other hand, realists would definitely brush 
aside any peace studies/conflict-resolution arguments or international bu-
reaucratic advice that Georgia could have further counted on collective in-
stitutions, attempted additional reconciliatory steps and the like. According 
to Mearsheimer, “states temporarily led astray by the false promise of insti-
tutionalist rhetoric eventually come to their senses and start worrying about 
the balance of power”69. 
Constructivism, i.e. The Sociological Approach. With its emphasis 
on the contextual, subjective nature of truth, constructivism in international 
relations can be associated with postmodern/post-structural critical theory70. 
But, as Alexander Wendt points out, constructivists accept arguments about 
the role of structures and remain modernists “who fully endorse the scientific 
project of falsifying theories against evidence”71. Unlike many critical theo-
rists, Wendt agrees that a state is a unit of analysis. 
However, constructivists believe that international structures are not 
only embedded in the material resources and rational choices of politicians, 
but (a) they might change the identity and the interests of statesmen; and (b) 
the very existence of structures depends on the shared understanding of their 
human creators and consumers. Thus the realist “security dilemma” becomes 
embedded in mistrust and competition between the actors, while the liberal 
concept of a “security community” rests on common values. In constructiv-
ist terms, these social structures are inter-subjective mental constructs which 
derive from social experience and further shape it72.
Such a belief is the source of the constructivists’ interest in the role 
of ideas — norms, values, identity — among international actors. According 
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to Peter Katzenstein, state-level actors follow norms, which constitute their 
identity, are enrooted in collective expectations, and might have a strong caus-
al effect73. In the constructivist account, the nation-state is like an actor on 
the stage. His behavior is defined by the role he is given… But it is not only 
the worldwide cultural concept of the nation state which shapes an actor’s 
identity and behavior. Domestic cultural definitions of the state and its role 
also influence state identity and action74.
An interesting example explaining strategic behavior using the concept 
of state identity is given by Michael Barnett in Identity and Alliances in the 
Middle East75. One the one hand, he defines the liberalist theory of demo-
cratic peace as a culturally constructed constitutive norm according to which, 
if civilized states decide to fight, they endanger the group identity of such 
states76. On the other hand, he uses the example of Israel to show that any 
individual state identity is not just based on universal international expecta-
tions, but constitutes a collection of contradicting values and narratives. In 
the Israeli case, these are liberal-democracy, religiousness, nationalism, and 
the Holocaust77. One of his conclusions is that to understand state identity 
one has to analyze not only its relations with other states, but also its inter-
action with its own society78. 
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde give another constructiv-
ist insight into the security-related policies and attitudes of international ac-
tors. For them, security policy is a “panic” one, employed to check perceived 
existential threats. Identifying the referent objects to be protected at any cost, 
the authors agree that “in the political sector, existential threats are tradition-
ally defined in terms of the constituting principle — sovereignty… Sovereign-
ty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, le-
gitimacy, or governing authority.” On the other hand, they acknowledge that, 
in the modern world, international regimes and international society are ad-
ditional referent objects of the political sector of security. Thus these also “can 
be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms, and 
institutions that constitute those regimes”79.
Buzan and his colleagues pay special attention to the act of “securitiza-
tion” of the issue, meaning the legitimization of special measures, including 
military, if the referent object is believed to be threatened. “For the analyst 
to grasp this act… is to understand the processes of constructing a shared 
understanding of what is to be considered, and collectively responded to, as 
a threat”80. The so-called facilitating conditions — the ability to convince an 
audience in the existence of signs of a threat — are especially important in 
this process81.
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Who does the securitization — and on what premises — are the keys 
to arguing in a constructivist manner, whether it is Saakashvili, whose order 
of August 7 was legitimate and thus justified, or the critics from the interna-
tional community who have grounds in contemporary universal norms and 
values to speak about his mistake. 
On the one hand, constructivists stress that international “epistemic 
communities” and organizations carry the world institutional and discur-
sive order. States’ jurisdiction and agenda experiences influence of the trans-
national context. Many nations are dominated by anti-military values, thus 
making their security policies less assertive82. If this is the only or dominant 
picture of where the world is heading, the Georgian option to take up the 
challenge and fight would seem inadequate. However, talking about “welfare” 
versus “warfare” states and considering the former a relatively new phenom-
enon, constructivists (a) indicate new forms of world disorder, mentioning 
that religion and societal ideologies might eventually acquire stronger con-
trol over global society than international law or industrialism; and (b) they 
acknowledge the clash between new and old norms, saying that the very ex-
istence of a norm does not mean necessary obedience to it83. As Carl Kay-
sen points out, “the cultural transformation is far from complete. Wars still 
mobilize national sentiments”84. “Disarmers and pacifists in opposition have 
changed their views when they have led or joined governments. Those who 
have maintained these views have remained outsiders”85.
Sociologically, identity’s primary aim is control, the maintenance of 
footing, and its objectives are by-products of previous stories, networks and 
cultural influences86. Consequently, identities with story-lines deeply rooted 
in a belief in an emerging post-national world have an argument against the 
Georgian attack. These could be members of so-called epistemic communi-
ties with post-national/postmodern discourse, or they may represent some 
international or national bureaucracies from “welfare” states. That is the rea-
son why Saakashvili’s choice does not find unequivocal approval even among 
some friends who treasure freedom, condemn Russian imperialism, but who 
do not understand the logic of national interests and strategic calculations. 
Following the particular constructivist account mentioned above that 
not only sovereignty, but also international regimes, rules and norms can be 
the referent objects of political security87, these circles might argue that Geor-
gian policy went against the latter. They may feel and claim that the Georgian 
attack targeted not simply Ossetian or Russian armed adversaries, but indi-
rectly went against the emerging anti-military culture of the post-national 
European civilization, thus threatening the supra-national identity of peace-
loving democracies. Such logic may lead to the extreme demand of sanction-
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ing Georgia, as the above-cited Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell at-
tempt. However, whether one takes a broader constructivist or liberalist out-
look, these critics seem controversial. Unless they reject the right of the inde-
pendence and the foreign policy choice of nations based on international law, 
their arguments remain incomplete. But if they attempt to do this, dominant 
international relations perspectives would not back such an attitude. Neither 
is the legalistic view so radical, as the fact-finding mission report shows.
At the same time, constructivism sees supra-national cultural tenden-
cies as just one, not necessarily dominant, vision of current international rela-
tions. For Buzan, Wendt, Katzenstein and others, national identity and state 
sovereignty remain particularly important units of analysis. Looking from 
Georgia’s position through constructivist lenses, whether one applies Bu-
zan’s argument about securitization and the importance of political security, 
or White’s understanding of how and why identities fight for control, the at-
tack on Tskhinvali is explainable and justifiable:
1. According to many international sources the reason for the attack 
was deeply rooted in the belief that Georgia’s survival as an inde-
pendent entity, not to mention its territorial integrity, were at stake. 
And this was not just Saakashvili’s personal conviction.
2. Tskhinvali represented the main stronghold of separatists in the 
centre of the country. Given the undeniable fact of reinforcements 
coming from Russia in support of the separatists, the protection of 
the Georgian controlled villages located between Tskhinvali and 
the Russian border was hardly imaginable by the Georgians unless 
through a military advance on that town.
3. Arguing that the scale of the objective threat to Georgian villag-
es, to the Georgian government or to the entire country was not 
high might be relevant for legal experts but not so much from 
the sociological perspective: Each identity defines threats accord-
ing to its own judgment. This judgment is inter-subjective, mean-
ing the existence of Buzan’s “facilitating condition” — the necessity 
to convince and to be convinced within the fellow members of a 
collective identity based on shared experiences and norms. Speak-
ing from a constructivist point of view, even a small but illegal in-
cursion of Russian units, when low intensity fighting was already 
going on and Putin was openly backing the separatists who were 
threatening to clean up Georgian villages, was enough for a Geor-
gian military reaction.
However, “facilitating condition” does not work on the part of the epis-
temic communities and international bureaucracies mentioned above, which 
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have different identity, adhere to norms other than the national, and have a 
different reading of international rules. As a result of this, arguments and facts 
might not be able to change their conviction. 
Summing up the three theoretical perspectives, constructivists would 
be the first to accept Saakashvili’s explanation that neither would he have 
survived if he took no action, nor would Georgia have maintained its sov-
ereignty88. By and large, most of the above-mentioned liberalist and realist 
assumptions also back the logic of the Georgian attack. But realists and lib-
eralists who believe in the existence of an extra-perceptional objective real-
ity, as well as some friendly critics of Saakashvili’s decision, would continue 
searching for proof that the threat was really as deadly as Saakashvili and his 
followers believed. They would look for additional arguments in support of 
the asymmetric move of the tiny Georgian army against the limitless military 
potential of Russia. The following chapter attempts to bring extra arguments 
as to why presidential, governmental or national survival was at stake, thus 
requiring extraordinary counter-measures. 
The Complex of Threats Faced by Georgia
Whether one looks for the causes of the August war as a realist, liber-
alist or constructivist, a focus solely on the number of troops and the inten-
sity of fire in the conflict zone prior to the Georgian attack does not appear 
sufficient. No less important is an analysis of the intentions and non-military 
methods in a long-standing Russian-Georgian confrontation — the broader 
security context in which the complex of threats to Georgia was embedded. 
Such an analysis reveals that military pressure on Georgian positions on the 
ground had just been the tip of the iceberg. At stake was not only Georgian 
territorial integrity, but its modernization project as well. This context shaped 
the modalities of reciprocal animosity in general, and the Georgian military 
attack in particular. The August war was just a “continuation of politics by 
other means”, to use the classic civil-military concept.
The international community was aware that Putin wanted to depose 
the Georgian president89. But one might still think that this was only because 
of the Tskhinvali attack, which infuriated the Russians. The EU-sponsored 
fact-finding mission reveals what sort of political and military provocations 
preceded the Georgian attack. But the report falls short of assessing the ra-
tionale behind such provocations. Ronald Asmus talks about the geopolitical 
nature of this war, saying that Russia wanted to stop Georgia’s drive towards 
NATO. However, Asmus does not elaborate substantially on the reasons for 
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the Kremlin’s resentment towards the young Georgian elite, and the complex 
methods or circumstances it could rely on to challenge the Georgian politi-
cal system.
Andrey Illarionov’s largely legal account of continuous Russian mili-
tary aggression is a useful part of the puzzle. According to this, Georgia had 
a casus belli much earlier than midnight on August 7. But the military/legal 
logic of his judgment is only one part of the story, still leading towards a dis-
cussion of the proportionality of Georgian countermeasures. As to the criti-
cal attitude of Lincoln Mitchell, Alexander Cooley or Tom De Waal, despite 
their deviation from mainstream theoretical assumptions, it can paradoxi-
cally help answer the core questions of this paper: Why did Georgia have to 
attack Tskhinvali, and why even some of Georgia’s international supporters 
find this difficult to justify?
According to Asmus, Saakashvili said that without attacking the ad-
versary the sovereignty of Georgia would not have survived. De Waal and 
Mitchell do not believe this. The reason for their mistrust is a de-contextu-
alized trust in participation and confidence-building measures; a general dis-
taste of national interests, and Georgia’s mixed democratic record. For them, 
the Georgian government was too nationalistic and reluctant to adhere to 
good governance practices. Such an attitude, also present in international in-
stitutions before the war, contributed to the negligence of the complex threats 
faced by Georgia, leaving Saakashvili at the mercy of Russian “peacekeeping”. 
This negligence, an inability to understand Georgia’s peculiar security dilem-
mas, is an important component of any explanation of Saakashvili’s decision 
to “shake the world” on August 7.
Post-revolutionary Georgian security sector transformation did face se-
curity-versus-democracy dilemmas90. Such a phenomenon is well known in 
security sector reform analysis. But such analysis also reveals that a scholastic 
approach to establishing democratic control over the security sector in war-
torn or conflict-driven societies can be dangerously destabilizing. Relevant 
research emphasizes that civil society organizations, which are believed to 
play a crucial part in participatory democracy and in promoting democratic 
transparency, are not immune from biased sectarian interests91. According to 
some security analysts, “many of those organizations are themselves open to 
criticisms: for example, for their lack of representation, accountability and 
questionable implementation of measures that support human security”92.  
Their watchdog activity, while necessary for any democratic polity to tolerate 
and even encourage, could unintentionally benefit anti-state forces, be they 
militant fundamentalists, terrorists or the like93.
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Since the Cold War, security is no longer an exclusive domain of in-
terstate relations: It is being entered by ethnic/religious camps, terrorists and 
mafias94. Logically, the bigger such threats are, the more dangerous they be-
come not only for states, but also for democracy and human rights national-
ly or internationally. In such conditions a one-sided democratic challenge to 
states by an influential part of the international epistemic community can be 
regarded as a postmodern political paradox: Non-state actors become domi-
nant threats for national or international well-being; only states are capable 
of dealing with them efficiently; but postmodern, post-national critics resist 
these very states, not offering any other protection from these new threats.
However, such observations have remained largely neglected by local 
and international opponents of the Georgian government. They have had an 
impact on some Western decision-makers, themselves under the influence of 
a postmodern suspicion of traditional national security reasoning. As James 
Sherr describes it, after the Cold War NATO and EU realism “was also hob-
bled by Post-modern assumptions which, to this day, exert a powerful influ-
ence on mindsets, discourse, and tools of policy. Among these are: The sys-
tematic devaluation of nation and state — the building blocks of the modern 
world — and an overestimation of transnational forces”95. Advocacy of lim-
iting a state’s ability to confront anti-systemic forces is also evident among 
experts in international law. As outlined in the EU-sponsored fact-finding 
mission report, some lawyers tend to equate state authorities with secession-
ist movements. According to such a view, if a state splits into two parts, the 
situation can be seen as interstate war, and each side is entitled to invite a 
third party in its support96. 
Such widespread mistrust of the nation state paradigm was one of the 
important ingredients of the complex nature of the threats faced by Geor-
gia. Its epistemological premise, that a state’s democratic performance can be 
conducted and assessed separately from its internal/external security chal-
lenges and interests, had a risky potential for the belated modernization of 
the country. Such an attitude contributed to an underestimation of develop-
ments leading up to the August war. It did not let Georgia cope with the 
Russian threat earlier and in a different manner97. In James Sherr’s words, 
“Well before the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia conflict of August 2008, it 
had become increasingly obvious that the West’s entire post-Cold War and 
largely post-modern schema of security had done nothing to avert, and per-
haps much to abet, the revival of a classically modern, Realpolitik culture of 
security in Russia”98. Together with other causes, including the purely mili-
tary ones outlined in previous chapters, this could have left Georgia with no 
other option but to attack Tskhinvali: The Georgian government had grounds 
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to believe that focusing only on democratic transparency and participation, 
while being under the constant suspicion of post-national players and not re-
ceiving any international hard security assistance, was enabling the separatists 
and their Russian supporters to dismantle the country.
Besides separatism and its reliance on unintentional encouragement 
from the international epistemic community, a further new threat was also a 
factor leading to the August war, namely, organized crime. Fighting it became 
especially complicated under the scrutiny of NGOs, and the postmodern 
media capacity to create a virtual reality and manipulate public opinion. This 
fight contributed to limiting participatory democracy in Georgia and rais-
ing critical voices internationally. According to James Sherr cited above, the 
“demarcation lines prerequisite to political order — internal vs. foreign, mili-
tary vs. civil, economic vs. political, state vs. criminal — were eroding across 
Eurasia”99. It required a special effort from states and international institu-
tions. Yet again, Georgia’s anti-criminal campaign used to meet a lack of un-
derstanding from the same postmodern part of the international community. 
Any cleavage between Georgian government and representatives of interna-
tional institutions was becoming fertile ground for Russia to exploit.
But there are further reasons to link the phenomenon of the influen-
tial Georgian criminal world to the Georgian-Russian confrontation: Given 
the international scope of organized crime, the postmodern erosion of the 
difference between internal and external politics, and the unquestioned fact 
of separatists’ cooperation with Russia, it is small wonder that there would 
also exist a connection between Georgian criminals and the same external 
source of Georgia’s troubles. The fact that, in the nineties, a disproportion-
ally large numbers of Moscow’s mafia bosses were Georgians100, speaks for 
itself in this respect. 
The problem of the Georgian mafia for national security when Saa-
kashvili’s team came to power through a popular peaceful uprising in No-
vember 2003 was in its interference in every sector of the economy, as well 
as its intervention into politics. Saakashvili’s predecessor, Shevardnadze, ad-
mitted that “thieves in law”101 had eaten the country102. In fact, Georgia un-
der Shevardnadze was becoming a failed or so-called mafia-dominated state.
Saakashvili openly attacked the mafia. Besides its structures, the gov-
ernment targeted some cultural characteristics of Georgian society, namely 
traditional rhetoric and story sets or styles implicitly linked to criminal men-
tality103. This was part of Saakashvili’s modernization agenda, which implied 
strengthening or even building state institutions from scratch, challenging 
ethnic and clan affiliations, and promoting a sense of modern citizenship 
through new rhetoric and reform of the education system. Logically, all this 
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would be impossible to achieve without sidelining criminal networks and 
fighting widespread corruption.
In December 2005, belonging to the mafia world became a criminal of-
fence even without being charged with a specific crime. A reformed Interior 
Ministry and Prosecutor’s Office were conducting operation after operation. 
The declared zero tolerance of criminals drastically increased the prison pop-
ulation. Taking control of prisons, where the mafia traditionally had shared 
control with the corrupt authorities, caused riots and deaths. Influential crim-
inals were killed, imprisoned or left the country. Some shady businessmen 
and politicians with mafia affiliations also went abroad. It all did bring re-
sults — the state was instituted in Georgia, and started to deliver public ser-
vices. In March 2007 Saakashvili declared to Parliament that the backbone 
of the system of crime bosses had been broken.
However, the story did not end there. The Georgian mafia appeared 
not very experienced in resisting a revolutionary government, but it did try to 
survive and wait for a moment to strike back. This moment came in Novem-
ber 2007. Further research is needed to determine what the exact role of the 
Georgian mafia was in organizing the mass discontent, demonstrations and 
clashes with the police that occurred in Tbilisi at that time. But the combined 
attack on the government did shake the fundamentals of the modernization 
project. If the project had failed, mafia bosses hiding abroad or jailed would 
definitely have acquired a second chance to return to the scene. 
Of course, the November protests had grounds broader than mafia in-
terests. Saakashvili’s modernization reforms were painful, leaving thousands 
of families without a regular income. One outspoken segment of his oppo-
nents comprised members of the former science, art and culture nomenkla-
tura. Traditionally this used to enjoy extra care from communist and post-
communist leaderships and was respected by mafiosi, but had been neglected 
by the new government. The fight against organized crime and corruption 
contributed to the centralization of power, something not liked by the po-
litical opposition. Nor did it occur without cases of police brutality result-
ing in innocent deaths. Despite the fact that for the first time in recent years 
guilty policemen had been imprisoned, the opposition and the families of 
victims questioned the thoroughness of the investigations and the severity of 
the punishments. Some of these, together with representatives of frustrated 
academic and artistic circles, resorted to ethnic nationalism. Others adopted 
the language of a post-modern epistemic community. On the one hand, Saa-
kashvili’s government was being portrayed as alien to the Georgian primor-
dial soul. On the other hand, he was being challenged through the human 
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rights discourse. The same people could also have participated in both dis-
courses from time to time.
The scale of the protests, as well as the responses to them, including 
rhetoric, police operations, and the resignation of Saakashvili with eventu-
al snap presidential elections held in January 2008, indicated that just half a 
year prior to the war with Russia, the political or regime security in Georgia 
was under clear threat104. A postmodern flavor was added to this by the most 
popular and powerful private TV channel “Imedi”, which took a clearly anti-
governmental stance. Social scientists observe that “what really changes po-
litical opinion is events, argument, press photographs and TV”105. As men-
tioned above, the discontent of many dwellers in the capital city had grounds 
in reality. However, the forms of its expression and channeling depended 
substantially on subjective images broadcast electronically. Imedi was a mass 
mobilizer through controversial but appealing accusations that the govern-
ment was simultaneously betraying ethnic/clan and human rights principles. 
On November 7, in the midst of clashes in the streets being broadcast 
on Imedi TV in a non-stop manner, police raided the channel and took it 
off the air. The reason was the fear that the TV station had been fuelling re-
ligious extremism. Given Imedi’s past record, a distaste for the pro-Western 
government by some religious circles and the opinion expressed by an Imedi 
anchor that people did not seem safe even when seeking shelter in a church, 
such fear was not unjustified. But a result was that Freedom House down-
graded Georgia’s score for media freedom106.
In confronting protesters with riot police and in shutting down their 
TV outlet the government believed that it was fighting not only a joint plot 
by indigenous extremists and criminals, but also the Russian “fifth column” 
as well. If proved, such a belief could serve at least as an explanation of its ac-
tions, which were dubious from the human rights point of view107. While the 
political opposition, journalists and some NGOs who took part in anti-gov-
ernmental protests strongly deny any relation to organized crime or to Rus-
sian special services, the truth appeared more complicated: 
Imedi TV was owned by a shady Russian oligarch of Georgian origin, 
Badri Patarkatsishvili, who had made a fortune in Russia during a period of 
almost total lawlessness. In those years, according to official sources, about 
80% of businesses were making payments to the mafia and 4,000 companies 
were under its direct control108. In autumn 2007 he openly joined the oppo-
sition. On the eve of the snap presidential election, a confidential conversa-
tion of his with a high-ranking police officer was taped and broadcast on TV. 
Patarkatsishvili was asking for his assistance in rigging the election and in 
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“neutralizing” the Minister of the Interior. He did not deny that such a con-
versation had occurred. 
The leadership of the protesters demanded the release of many pris-
oners, notwithstanding their charges. The prison population was especially 
excited by the protests, in which thousands of their family members partici-
pated. Hundreds of youngsters with a still alive criminal mentality were ac-
tively taking part in clashes with the police. Many outspoken leaders of the 
rallies were directly challenging Saakashvili’s every reform, including his an-
ti-criminal campaign. The report on a Georgian mafia case in Austria indi-
cating financial support to a part of the Georgian opposition in 2009 is also 
noteworthy, albeit retrospectively, for tracing organized crime in anti-gov-
ernmental actions109. 
It is small wonder then that the outburst of xenophobic and clannish/
criminal sentiments and traces of the mafia behind the mass rallies could pro-
duce a siege mentality in governmental circles. The fact that some journal-
ists and NGOs were complementing backward-looking protests with demo-
cratic ingredients added postmodern complications to this attempt at regime 
change. The November experience would assure the government that, in case 
of the uninterrupted development of the Russian scenario in the conflict 
zones, another strike in the capital could be more dangerous, if not deadly. 
Such perceptions may give rise to the security politics of preemption. The 
police operation against the protesters in Tbilisi on November 7, as well as 
the military one on August 7 bear the elements of such preemption against 
threats which were both seen as too dangerous to wait until their logical end. 
Hence, the connection of November 7 to August of 7 is indirect, at least sty-
listic, but not groundless. 
This connection would appear much more substantial when and if Rus-
sia’s hand in destabilization attempts in Tbilisi is convincingly reckoned. In 
a way, revealing an alliance between the Georgian mafia and the Russian se-
cret services looks to be the key for an understanding of Georgia’s danger-
ous security environment and the reasoning behind its August 7 military at-
tack: Having the mafia in the rear, while the Russian/Ossetian advance on 
Georgian positions seemed imminent, the Georgian government would have 
struck one side or the other so as to ruin its adversaries’ plans and avoid/delay 
the possibility of their concerted effort. 
Exposure of joint mafia-Russian subversive activity against Georgia 
could occur in various ways: Investigating the case; collecting general infor-
mation on Russian state-mafia cooperation for foreign policy purposes; and 
analyzing the nature of the internal regime of Putin’s Russia. Recent allega-
tions by a senior Spanish investigator are indicative in all these respects. Ac-
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cording to him, Moscow’s strategy is to use “organized crime groups to do 
whatever the government of Russia cannot acceptably do as a government”. 
While not saying anything about Russian subversive plans regarding Geor-
gia, he mentions the two most influential Georgian “thieves in law” cooper-
ating with the Russian secret services. “Oniani now enjoyed the protection of 
both the FSB and Russia’s interior ministry even in prison” — says the Span-
ish investigator110.
Putin’s regime could not tolerate the Georgian modernization experi-
ment on the systemic account, and this was one of the main reasons for the 
years-long animosity. In addition to geopolitics, the Kremlin should have had 
even stronger incentives against Saakashvili’s government: Georgian emanci-
pation from its post-Soviet feudal mentality and institutions started in 2003. 
The process was radical, and conducted in a centralized manner. Some oppo-
nents suggested that the Georgian model repeated certain features of Putin’s 
Russia. But a sociological approach reveals qualitative difference between two.
For instance, Harrison White considers “control regimes”, including 
political ones, in connection with decision-making styles, institutions, rhet-
oric and narratives. He pays special attention to how identities manage to 
mobilize support111, and outlines that adherence to written laws allows indi-
viduals to live in more complex societies, where personal connections are not 
enough for social trust and stable expectations112. White divides regimes into 
corporatist, clientelistic and professional ones. For him, corporatist and pro-
fessional regimes are based on rights, values, and a division and management 
of responsibilities. Clientelistic regimes are associated with hierarchical and 
personalistic patronage ties113. According to White, “clientelism has issues of 
respect, of the following of certain codes of conduct, of rules of reciprocity, 
as we know, for example, from the Mafia”114. On the other hand, corporat-
ism for White is associated with the suppression of personal/clan loyalty by 
adherence to more abstract ideas, values and less personalized institutions115. 
The author does acknowledge that some features of one regime can be pres-
ent in another. But to apply White’s model to Russia and Georgia, notwith-
standing the issue of democracy in this respect, one can speak about strong 
clientelism in the former and, if not a professional, at least a corporatist re-
gime in the latter.
The Wikileaks cables have contributed substantially to the character-
ization of the Russian regime. Based on these, an article published in the 
Guardian newspaper identifies Russia as a corrupt, autocratic kleptocracy 
centered on the leadership of Vladimir Putin in which officials, oligarchs and 
organized crime are bound together to create a “virtual mafia state”… Law 
enforcement agencies such as the police, spy agencies and the Prosecutor’s 
47
The August War: A Case for International Relations Theory and an Understanding of Modern Threats 
Office operate a de facto protection racket for criminal networks116. The same 
conclusions can be found in the writings of many authors, Daniel Kimmage 
being one of them117.
Kimmage observes the emergence of a new Russian paradigm that can 
be associated with White’s style, rhetoric and narrative. This includes the pro-
paganda of the Stalinist and Tsarist past simultaneously. Kimmage describes 
this in the form of a rhetorical question: “Is there a touch of the postmodern 
in all this free play of decontextualised symbols? Or is it just conceptual cha-
os?”118 The style of the Russian regime also involves the mentality and value 
system of the criminal underworld, famous in Soviet times as a particular 
“understanding” — the prevalence of an unwritten code of conduct over writ-
ten laws. This is what Saakashvili attempted to eradicate in Georgian socio-
political culture119. Clientelism in a modern (or post-modern) sense cannot 
exist without such codes as alternatives to official legislation.
Some Western thinkers also trace “postmodernism” in Saakashvili’s 
Georgia, albeit not in the sense of stylistic/rhetorical ingredients as in Russia. 
In “Caucasian Postmodernists”120, Alain Gerard Slama compares the Geor-
gian leadership with the Russian one and with some other post-Soviet states. 
He talks about Georgian differences in terms of its young Georgian leader-
ship, relying on a new generation, on women and on national minorities to 
depart from a xenophobic and corrupt past. He sees Saakashvili’s Georgia as 
a paradox of simultaneously patriotic and pro-Western experience, which so 
far survives despite internal and external opposition and looks like an attempt 
at a “postmodern synthesis”. 
Observers argue whether the Georgian democratic glass is half full or 
half empty. But in the sociological/structural terms of Harrison White, one 
can talk about a peculiar Georgian control regime that fights with mafia-style 
patron-client chains, while promoting a selfless modernization agenda. By 
and large, the fight against organized crime, corruption and clientelism was 
the main reason for the protest rallies, despite what some opposition figures 
used to say openly or genuinely believe. The social portrait of many protest-
ers and their rhetoric spoke for themselves121.
Given the differences between the Russian and Georgian control re-
gimes, their rivalry on geopolitical, sovereignty, energy or any other account 
was destined to reach an extremely hostile level. This is reflected in the social 
background of Putin and Saakashvili and their attitudes towards each oth-
er. One was educated in the West, and hated communists and the USSR on 
liberal, as well as national grounds. The other came from KGB circles, and 
called the demolition of the USSR the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of 
twentieth century. But their hostility was greater than a personal dislike. The 
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Georgian control regime was challenging the Russian one in the whole post-
Soviet space. As the French analyst Alain Gerard Slama said, Georgia was an 
interesting model for those who do not refuse to fight for freedom122. If so, 
Putin would have done everything to make Georgia a failure.
The Russian methodology used against the Georgian regime oscillated 
between traditional, nineteenth-century-style pressures on Georgian sover-
eignty, including by military means, and a postmodern version of the KGB’s 
“active measures”, “reflective control” and information warfare123. Being a 
Russian expression which has entered international jargon, ‘disinformation’ 
tactics were especially important. The usage of semi-neutral language, a mix-
ture of facts and interpretations, provision of part of the truth while claiming 
that it is a complete one are some of its features124. 
Examples of traditional military pressure have been outlined in previ-
ous chapters. These were combined with such crossings of red lines as Rus-
sia’s unilateral withdrawal from the CIS sanctions regime adopted against 
Georgian secessionist territories back in 1996. A few weeks later, on April 3, 
Putin informed the separatists that he would help them practically125. These 
steps can be regarded as a direct challenge to Georgia’s political security. All 
this was backed by manipulation with peacekeeping principles against Geor-
gian sovereignty. During the war this acquired a clear form of the disinfor-
mation of the international community: as mentioned above, after August 7 
the main Russian argument against Georgia was the controversial deaths of 
a few Russian peacekeepers. 
The following episode is especially interesting in terms of Russia’s ap-
proach to the creation of a virtual reality: In the midst of the fighting in 
Tskhinvali, a Russian Deputy Foreign Minister called his Georgian counter-
part concerning casualties among the Russian peacekeeping contingent some 
three hours earlier than the first casualty occurred, according to the Russian 
Ministry of Defense. To Asmus this constituted “an additional piece of evi-
dence that suggests that the war — including its rationale — may have been 
preplanned”126.
In its informational offensive, Russia relied on shell internet companies 
who would create an image of broad societal anger against the Georgian gov-
ernment. In this way it tried to mask the involvement of Russian intelligence 
in this activity127. But more harmful were the attempts to spread disinforma-
tion through more or less reliable media on the international level. Such in-
formation, presented in a way “that many will either find plausible or, at the 
very least, impossible to check… quickly gets picked up by other sources that 
use it in good faith, which in turn adds credibility to the disinformation”128. 
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During the culmination of the interstate confrontation, the above link 
between Russian officials and the Georgian mafia would have especially wor-
ried the Georgian government. Neither could part of the political opposi-
tion to Saakashvili be excluded from possible secret cooperation with the 
Russians129. In addition, the Georgian government did have an argument to 
suspect Russian meddling in the Georgian media, thus creating a subversive 
virtual reality directly on Georgian soil. Linkage of the above-mentioned 
Imedi TV with Moscow’s political circles can be based on two assumptions: 
It was run by owners/experts with an apparent Moscow track record; and its 
technique of the creation of a virtual reality was quite similar to the Russian 
media of the nineties.
Imedi TV’s former owner was a friend and colleague of the Russian 
king-makers of nineties, Berezovski and Gusinski. They were jointly creat-
ing a Russian media empire that helped the political elite hold onto power 
through the sophisticated disinformation of the public. They employed high-
ranking experts from the former Soviet security service, the KGB130. In its 
fight against the government in 2005-2007, Imedi TV also had Russian con-
sultants in media/political technologies131. The fact that neither Patarkatsish-
vili, nor especially his friends, Berezovski and Gusinski, were in Putin’s team 
at that time, would not change much in Georgian suspicion of Russia’s hand: 
Russian political technologies were rich with cases of the same person being 
an open opponent and a hidden ally of the ruling class. In any case, helping 
Putin to restore Russia’s influence in Georgia could have brought benefits. 
While the story of Imedi ended a few months prior to the Russian-
Georgian war when its shady owner suddenly passed away, the government 
could not resist permanent concern over Russia’s connections with the local 
media, the political opposition or civil society organizations. At times, this 
could have looked like paranoia resulting from a siege mentality, or just an 
argument against its internal political opponents, but such concern was not a 
mystery. Russia was globally “pursuing classical nineteenth-century aims with 
twenty-first century tools: intelligence and covert penetration, commerce and 
joint ventures ‘lobbying structures’ and litigation, energy and downstream 
investment and, in the former USSR, Russian diasporas and other ‘civiliza-
tional” forms of soft power’”132 This “soft power”, in combination with covert 
penetration, was nothing but the encouragement of anti-Western attitudes 
based on xenophobia and the clannish/criminal mentality still to be found in 
abundance in the region. Informational back-up in such a policy was no less 




Paul Goble mentions insightfully that the “Russia-Georgia war of Au-
gust 2008 was and remains first and foremost an information war, in which 
the victories and defeats in that sphere were in many ways more important 
and fateful than those which took place on the ground”133. Gobble is essen-
tially referring only to the events of August, and the struggle to promote one’s 
version of the war internationally. But until the outbreak of open warfare, it 
was not Russian propaganda in the West, promoted by PR companies like the 
Russia Today TV channel, nor the New York based Institute for Democracy 
and Cooperation134, which could have harmed Georgia most of all. Instead, 
it was the covert penetration of the Georgian political and societal fabric and 
discourse that would have delivered the final blow to its government when 
the appropriate moment came. 
Georgian officials got the feeling of the forthcoming final blow in the 
spring-summer of 2008. The security situation deteriorated extremely in the 
Tskhinvali region and in Abkhazia as well. As indicated by Ronald Asmus, 
Saakashvili believed passiveness would have been the most appropriate con-
dition for Russia to dictate its terms and activate all “soft power” measures 
in the Georgian capital. Undermining Saakashvili’s positions in the conflict 
zones without fierce resistance or without open and large-scale interven-
tion would allow Russia to direct the nationalist emotions of many ordinary 
Georgians against its government. So the attack on Tskhinvali can be seen as 
a sort of asymmetric, aikido-style maneuver to gain the initiative and to re-
direct the tools of the adversary against himself. 
As the initial success of the attack shows, Russia should have either ac-
commodated its results, thus bringing the confrontation to an end, or launch 
a full-scale invasion and lose any legitimacy as a peacekeeper that it might 
still have had for some ordinary Georgians or internationally. In the latter 
case, Russia’s ability for subversive actions against the Georgian government 
would have been seriously undermined. The Georgian government would 
have acquired stronger moral and legal grounds to suppress any attempts to 
cooperate with an openly invading Russia. The mass of Georgians would ap-
parently have united in the face of such developments. And so it happened.
Attacking Tskhinvali, and thus throwing the dice, was a risky tactic. On 
the one hand, the Georgian government was criticized internationally for be-
ing provocative and/or disproportionate. The Russian army almost marched 
into the capital, stopped only a few dozen kilometers from the government 
building. But the fact that it was stopped, as well as the still hypothetical but 
rather probable worst-case scenario if Saakashvili had done nothing, show 
that the political regime in Georgia had managed to survive, which is the 
first and foremost task for any government.
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Provocation in modern international relations is hardly justifiable ei-
ther legally or politically when it aims to change the status quo by force or 
to weaken popular attention to indigenous internal problems by the creation 
of a foreign “enemy”. History knows such examples, the war initiated by Ar-
gentina for the Falkland Islands being one of these. However, the Georgian 
government acted against the ongoing aggression of “peacekeeping” Russia, 
which was disguised in — or due to — postmodern conditions135. The Geor-
gian advance on Tskhinvali unmasked Russian intentions and gained few 
days for international interference. The results of the war showed that the in-
ternational community is still better suited to act against open, large-scale ag-
gression than against it in a low-scale postmodern disguise. With high proba-
bility, Saakashvili’s downfall through a low-scale intrusion and masterminded 
popular protests would have allowed Russia to finish with a rival corporatist 
regime, which had tried to modernize and emancipate the country. Of course, 
one cannot measure whether Russia’s covert operations were guaranteed to 
succeed if Saakashvili waited further for help from the international commu-
nity. But war is an option against what seems imminent, not what really is. 
Conclusion
The midnight military attack by the Georgian army on Tskhinvali was 
one of the essential events in the contemporary history of the country, high-
lighting the essence and difficulty of its modernization attempts. This event 
was an inseparable part of the long-standing Russian-Georgian confronta-
tion, which had deep and multilayered reasons. Given the complex of inter-
nal and external threats to Georgian sovereignty and integrity, and looking 
through the lenses of international relations theory, this attack can be as-
sessed as self-defense.
Moreover, this attack did not seem to have an alternative in the politi-
cal sense, while the purely military-technical modalities of its conduct do de-
serve separate and more critical scrutiny. Pre-history and context show that 
not attacking bore more risks for the political security of Georgia than an 
open military confrontation with Russia. Hence, a purely legal analysis of the 
Russian-Georgian war, as presented by the EU-sponsored fact-finding mis-
sion report, is insufficient. This attempted to analyze and assess the different 
stages of the confrontation separately, distributing accusations between the 
sides stage by stage. Such an approach makes it impossible to see the whole 
picture and cannot be regarded as academic.
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But this report and many other international accounts of the war, par-
ticularly those of Georgia’s actions, reveal the problematic nature of con-
temporary international security politics and discourse. International threats 
multiply and change form. Some states are under intense pressure from non-
state actors like organized crime and ethnic extremism, others try to capital-
ize on this against neighbors. Some analysts observe that assertive, authori-
tarian states such as Russia “have worked diligently to spread their influence 
through an extensive web of media concerns, public relations consultants, 
diplomatic initiatives, and nontransparent aid packages… authoritarian re-
gimes are eroding the international rules and standards built up by the demo-
cratic world over the past several decades, threatening to export the instability 
and abuses that their systems engender” 136. 
The security environment is complex also in another respect. Part of the 
so-called international epistemic and bureaucratic community constrains the 
struggle of young, transitional countries for their national interests, while not 
offering much in exchange. Postmodern, post-national thinking may, para-
doxically, overlook alliances of non-state actors and over-assertive authori-
tarians, and concentrate its critical attitude on smaller modernizing players. 
At least one is evident: International security regimes find it extremely diffi-
cult to uphold international law unequivocally and check disguised regional 
hegemonic ambitions against weaker neighbors. This does not leave much 
room for maneuver for countries like Georgia, as the August war case shows.
What lessons can be drawn from this case? Peace researches world-
wide should agree that nationalism is not present only in the protection of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Sometimes, more dangerous forms of it 
can be seen in players challenging these principles. With due attention to 
the protection of human rights and the freedom of the media, their inter-
national advocates should also think more how to check the abuse of these 
rights by anti-modernist forces. Otherwise, the democratic and peace-loving 
record of modernizers will remain uneven, because they have to take care of 
national security on their own. The founding father of liberal institutional-
ism, Robert Keohane, recently identified his research interest as understand-
ing what particular design will help multilateral institutions to be effective137. 
The Georgian example will definitely help a move towards this goal from a 
negative perspective.
Allan Collins points out that, while security studies and international 
relations are dominated by Western thought, “perhaps… we will witness the 
emergence of specifically African or Asian approaches to the study of security 
that will force us to rethink core assumptions”138. Georgia belongs to neither 
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of these two, nor is its case contrary to Western though in general. But maybe 
it can also help to rethink certain Western approaches. 
James Sherr points out that the war contributed to shaping and speed-
ing up the EU Eastern Partnership Initiative. This is a largely technical pro-
gram, but is also based on the political rationale that the West needs more 
engagement in this part of the world. He concludes that “…if the EU does 
not shy away from this potential, the Eastern Partnership will be the clear-
est indication that the Georgia conflict has served as a rite of passage in the 
EU’s perception of itself.”139 If this happens, Robert Keohane can be assisted 
in his quest and the genuine post-modern soft power approach can be rec-
onciled with the necessity of transitional states to accomplish their belated 
modernization tasks.
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insufficient to prove the preparation of an armed coup with Russian help, 
this recording does provide ground for governmental concerns regarding 
the existence of a Russian fifth column in the country. Using the retrospec-
tive method, such facts can shed additional light on the internal security 
situation in August 2008. 
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